We see a clash of paradigms in the West regarding relations with Belarus. For some, our country is a buffer state separating the West and the East; for others, it is a bridge connecting the Western and non-Western worlds. Some call for investing in discord and confrontation, others in pragmatic, mutually beneficial relations. Against the backdrop of increased contacts between Minsk and Washington, this struggle of approaches is coming to the forefront. And its outcome will largely predetermine the course of development in the European region.
We have written multiple pieces about the prospects of relations between Belarus and the USA. It's time to reflect on whether there is a mutual interest between Belarus and the EU, and whether it's worth looking for points of contact at all.
Before diving in, let's try to answer the question: what kind of Europe do we see in about ten years?
Under the current conditions, namely military and political confrontation, economic stagnation, evident technological lag, a course toward total militarization, and the growing radical political forces, the future scenario for our continent looks grim. If we do not attempt to change at least something, by 2035 Europeans will be facing the same problems, only to the umpteenth degree.
Within the next decade, Ukraine is likely to become a gray zone, a nest for bandits of all kinds: from radical militias to traffickers of weapons, drugs, and people. In place of the fence on the EU-Belarus border, we will see a potential frontline, with troops amassed on both sides.While the rest of the world continues to develop, progress, and compete in economy, technology, and AI, Europe risks being transformed into a peripheral backwater within ten years. Residents of European countries, when turning on TV, will hear not about new achievements in science and medicine, but about new military spending, the fight against soaring crime, and the need to tighten their belts even further. And for what purpose? For further decline?
Of course, this is just a sketch. But the fact that there are now ample reasons to outline such a scenario is, in itself, a cause for alarm. This is precisely why Minsk so persistently urges Europe to choose detente over escalation.
Indeed, Belarus tried to warn Europeans even before the current turbulent decade set in. In 2019, during the international conference “European Security: Stepping Back from the Brink” Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko warned: strategic rivalry between great powers is intensifying, the system of military-political checks and balances is crumbling before our eyes, trade wars and sanctions confrontations are gaining momentum, and the struggle for energy and raw materials is intensifying.
“The level of distrust and confrontation between East and West has reached its limit,” the president noted. “For example, in just a few minutes, Russia and NATO could go from an unintentional local conflict to a nuclear war.”
At the time, many considered Minsk's fears to be in the realm of fantasy. A war in civilized Europe? Unthinkable. But what do we see now? A large-scale war is being fought on the ground, and in the political, economic, diplomatic, and information realms. And Belarus, as has historically been the case, finds itself right in the epicenter.
Unfortunately, we cannot distance ourselves from this, hide behind fences, and pretend we are indifferent. All we can do is repeatedly call on Europe to come to its senses, return to dialogue, and work together to address what is happening in our shared European home.
For Western liberal circles, this question often sounds like a statement. It is crucial to recognize, however, that these circles are not monolithic; they contain both radical and moderate currents that advance competing approaches toward Belarus. This internal divergence fuels the paradigmatic struggle we mentioned earlier.
To understand how this struggle shapes Western policy, particularly that of European elites, and whether a pragmatic and equitable dialogue with them is possible in the future, it is worth examining the spectrum of opinions, from the openly confrontational to the more moderate.
Let's begin with the most ardent proponents of war. Last week, the Atlantic Council think tank published a comprehensive report on Belarus. In essence, it is a compilation of well-worn narratives about our country that offers nothing new; its conclusions have been voiced hundreds of times before by the Western establishment and its controlled media. Consider the authors' definitions of Belarus: a satellite, a military outpost, a springboard for aggression, an unreliable ally.
And yet, the Atlantic Council's report provides food for thought. Its primary audience is not the general public, but the political leadership of Western countries, whom the authors persistently try to persuade not to engage with Minsk, but to intensify pressure. To this end, the report offers "strategic recommendations for US and allied policy": fully integrate Belarus into NATO and EU threat assessments, strengthen and expand sanctions, and invest in "Belarusian democratic infrastructure."
"Belarus threatens NATO’s flank, enables Kremlin aggression, and offers a template for authoritarian consolidation elsewhere," the report asserts.
Have you noticed the shift? Just yesterday, proponents of this radical approach confidently set the tone for Western policy, but today they are forced to churn out reports to convince political elites not to deviate from the path of confrontation. This, perhaps, is the report's only true novelty.
"The window for action is narrowing. A coherent Western strategy that combines pressure with preparation can still tip the balance," the author concludes with a note of hope.
Meanwhile, the course of events is making realism and pragmatism increasingly commonplace in the West. The militant ideology of recent years has largely proven costly. This is especially true for Europe, where public trust is declining, discontent is growing, and with it, pressure on governments. Hence the rising popularity of far-right political forces that advocate for a pragmatic course.
And pragmatism does not mean portraying Belarus as an enemy or inventing absurd definitions like a "threat to NATO," but rather building mutually beneficial relations. Proponents of this approach call on Western elites to adjust their strategy toward Minsk, taking into account political realities and the situation in Europe.
In contrast to the Atlantic Council's position, we can cite the purely pragmatic approach of Mark Episkopos, a fellow at the American think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
“It is rare for foreign policy experts and analysts to witness such a stark example of absolute failure as the West's approach to Belarus since 2020,” Mark Episkopos writes in one of his recent works. “There is not a single indicator suggesting that anything undertaken against Minsk has worked.”
According to the analyst, the Donald Trump administration is abandoning the failed approach to Belarus and seeking to invest in stable, non-conflictual relations. Episkopos believes this is the only correct path and one that would be beneficial for all parties.
“The best and only effective way to resolve the current issues is through consistent dialogue with Belarus, not pressure to change the government or attempts to punish Minsk until it severs ties with Moscow. These strategies have been tested over the past five years and have proven to be highly counterproductive,” the author concludes.
In late September, an EU diplomat told The Guardian that even “maximum pressure” had failed in the case of Belarus. At the same time, he admitted that Brussels does not yet understand what should replace the current policy.
“European diplomatic sources have meanwhile said there are tentative discussions in Brussels over whether the EU’s policy of isolating Belarus remains effective,” The Guardian wrote.
Slovak political scientist and former diplomat Balázs Jarábik attempted to find an answer to the question of whether a new thaw in relations between Belarus and the European Union is possible. In his article published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he notes that Brussels has “locked itself into a normative framework” by cutting off dialogue with official Minsk while continuing to engage with the so-called opposition. “This institutional alignment provides both moral clarity and bureaucratic comfort, enabling EU officials to assert that their policies serve the Belarusian people,” the political scientist writes. Yet many Belarusians “would likely see things differently”, Balázs Jarábik said.
Speaking about Belarus' foreign policy, Jarábik noted Minsk's striving to build balanced relations and maintain peace in the region. “Lukashenko’s overriding aim remains to avoid direct involvement in the war,” the expert stresses. Furthermore, the political scientist believes Minsk is interested in maintaining limited contacts with the West. However, the hostile policies of Belarus' neighbors - Poland and Lithuania - as well as the EU's inert policy towards Minsk become a stumbling block here.
At the same time, the political scientist believes that interaction between Minsk and Brussels in certain areas, such as regional transit or border security, is not only possible but also increasingly relevant for both sides. But the European Union must understand that Belarus is ready to build relations based on its own interests. If the EU continues to ignore geopolitical considerations, it risks losing all influence in a region where, in the political scientist's view, the outcome of events is determined not so much by emotions as by cold calculation.
“As the US eases sanctions on Belarus, is it time for the EU to rethink its approach?” This is the headline of an article published last week by the British think tank Chatham House.
It is noteworthy that much of the article is devoted to criticism of Belarus, describing how the country allegedly fails to meet the democratic ideals of the West, the negative influence exerted by Russia, and so on. However, unlike the one-sided report of the Atlantic Council, the Chatham House analyst attempts to view the situation from another angle, not only through the prism of militant ideology, but also from a practical standpoint. Once this happens, unexpected conclusions emerge.
“The EU’s refusal to engage with Minsk entirely might risk strategic short-sightedness,” the article states.
At least, such engagement could take place in the cultural and humanitarian areas; at the most, in matters of security. “A more proactive policy could also help reduce the security risks,” the author writes, noting the particular relevance of this issue given that the EU and Belarus share a common border.
“Like the US, the EU should consider rethinking its policy towards Belarus, although its motivations might be different,” the author continues. “For the EU, it is about adopting a long-term approach to Belarus that increases the prospect of one day having a stable and accountable partner on its eastern border – something which complete isolation will not help achieve.”
Another report, this time from the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES, Slovenia), also addresses Belarus. Earlier this year, IFIMES published several reviews of the political and economic situation in Belarus, highlighting Minsk’s efforts to balance relations between East and West, to build ties within the Eurasian region, including through the SCO platform and along the Minsk-Beijing axis.
In its latest report, published at the end of October, the Slovenian institute describes Belarus as a Eurasian gateway and a geopolitical buffer.
“Belarus stands as a bridge between Eurasia and the European Union and is the only member of the SCO that maintains a direct connection to the EU. As a key logistical and industrial centre with a stable political framework, Belarus enables efficient integration of Eurasian economies with European markets. Its geographical position renders it a critical node for trade flows, transport corridors, and energy routes, reinforcing its relevance in both regional and global affairs,” IFIMES writes.
But Belarus is of interest not only from an economic perspective. “The country’s stability and well-developed infrastructure sustain not only the uninterrupted movement of goods and capital but also its role as a buffer zone that contributes to security and the balance of power among major geopolitical blocs, including Russia, China, and the European Union,” the report states.
IFIMES notes that Belarus’ strategic significance is also acknowledged across the Atlantic – in the United States. This is evidenced by recent contacts between Minsk and Washington, during which the Americans made clear their interest in strengthening bilateral ties and regional cooperation with Belarus.
“These diplomatic initiatives further confirm the strategic relevance of Belarus as both a logistical and political nexus in the region, positioning it as an indispensable partner in connecting Europe and Asia and in supporting transport and infrastructure projects, including prospective North–South corridors,” IFIMES stated.
The approach of the Slovenian institute is notable as it focuses not so much on division (a geopolitical buffer) but on economic integration (the Eurasian gateway). Indeed, if one looks at the situation not from the standpoint of confrontation but from the perspective of future prospects, Belarus really appears not as a buffer zone but as a bridge connecting the two shores of Eurasia. Our country has everything it takes to remain this bridge for many years to come: a strategic geographic location, shared cultural ties with both its Western neighbors and Russia, and a profound understanding of China, a nation Belarus has been closely cooperating with and learning from for three decades. Also, Belarus boasts the reputation of a reliable partner that strictly honors its commitments. Unfortunately, many so-called civilized countries lack this quality.
It is obvious that the West, including the EU, has completely different views on Belarus and its role in the region. In the near future, these competing views will vie for dominance. But will the proponents of confrontation prevail yet again?
To the casual follower of liberal media, the Atlantic Council’s approach is the gospel truth. Yet, within political elite circles, it is hard to imagine anyone being so inexperienced as to miss the factual manipulations and misrepresentation of causal links.
Take, for instance, the Atlantic Council’s claim that it is impossible to establish cooperation with Belarus because Minsk looks exclusively East. Or that Belarus’ ability to balance between East and West through its multi-vector foreign policy is nothing more than an illusion. Well, if there are illusions, it is time to dispel them.
The West has made no secret of the fact that it sees Belarus, just like Ukraine, as buffer states. Such countries are essentially supposed not only to separate the conflicting parties but also to play the role of a stabilizer, a keeper of the balance in the region. It would seem to be in the interests of all parties to maintain this balance, and the neutrality of the countries that serve as safety buffer for the entire continent. This is based on common sense. Whereas if we proceed from mad ambitions and a desire to dominate a rival, we get what is happening now.
The core of the problem is that the West never truly wanted to see Belarus or Ukraine as independent nations. The intended role for our countries was to remain a buffer zone that would fall under the Western sphere of influence while maintaining a hostile stance toward Russia. Had Moscow retaliated, Belarus and Ukraine would have become expendable pawns in a proxy war. Ukraine, in fact, met this fate when provocations targeting Russia crossed the line into an existential threat.
Even before the start of the Ukrainian conflict, the West had already begun to interfere in Ukraine’s politics, economy, military affairs, and mass media. As a result, Kiev stopped trying to maintain a balance in its relations and began to rock the boat itself, drifting toward the West. Not just politically, but militarily as well. Ukraine decided to join NATO, and this decision turned everything upside down. Western-Ukrainian propaganda still tells Ukrainians and people in Western countries that Ukraine has the right to act freely. But this is just an illusion. In today’s world where all states are interconnected and interdependent there is no country that can act without restrictions. Not even those with superpower status. As a buffer state, Ukraine was more restricted than anyone else.
While Ukraine was reaching out to the West, Belarus prioritized its relations with Russia. However, it did not prevent our country from balancing its relations. Both Russia and the West understood perfectly well that this balance was a kind of tacit peace agreement. Our country has never threatened either the West or the East. Minsk could argue about economics and politics with both Russia and the EU, but Belarus’ military neutrality remained a constant, and peace remained an immutable priority.
But the West was not satisfied with this state of affairs and set out to destabilize our country. And when it failed, it lowered an iron curtain in front of Belarus, cutting it off politically and economically and creating a threat to our state along its borders. And by doing so, it deprived Belarus of the opportunity to balance relations between the two sides and maintain peace.
So who, in that case, has upset the balance of power in Europe? Who is fixated on a policy of endless confrontation? Who provoked chaos on our continent and continues to drag Europe down? And along with that, who, being in a difficult position themselves, has been trying all this time to restore peace to our region? Who has tried to pull Ukraine out of the proxy war — both in the first weeks after the start of hostilities and now when Ukraine is on the verge of collapse as a state?
To be a stabilizer or some kind of guardian of balance are the roles that we did not want and did not choose. But, being on the geopolitical fault line between the West and the East, our country bears a huge burden of responsibility. And the fact that the Belarusian authorities have enough political experience and wisdom to bear this burden is a blessing for everyone.
Yes, Belarus has never been pro-Western, even during periods of brief thaws. However, our country has always remained pro-European, even during periods of heightened confrontation.
“Belarus is Europe. It is its geographical center. Neither Poles, nor Lithuanians, nor Latvians will be able to fence us off with barbed wire. But we need a new Europe, one that is truly independent, good-neighborly, economically developed, politically strong, spiritually rich, and culturally diverse. And, of course, one that is integrated into the Eurasian space in all key areas of cooperation,” Aleksandr Lukashenko said in his address to the Belarusian nation and the parliament in March 2023.
For Belarus, being pro-European means acting for the good of our common home. There should be room for everyone in this home: the EU countries, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus... If Europe gets there, it will not need walls, red lines, or buffer zones. But we need to act now so that in ten years we do not find ourselves on the ruins of a once prosperous region. A peaceful, united Europe has enormous potential to become a new center of growth in a rapidly changing world. We just need to use it correctly.
By BelTA’s Vita KHANATAYEVA